Tier 1
Off-main, non-privileged
The workhorse. Runs everyday reads and writes on a background actor, off the main thread — preferring array-arguments with no shell and no quoting for anything containing your input.
The safety model
Powerful by default. Never destructive by accident.
Catalyst's whole job is to run shell commands for you — so the execution layer is the most carefully guarded part of the app. Here's exactly how it protects you.
Three execution tiers
Nothing runs inline. Ever.
Every shell interaction is routed through exactly one of three tiers — each with its own guarantees.
Tier 2
Elevated, root
The most sensitive path. A native password dialog pipes to sudo in-memory, and the password is kept in your Mac's Keychain — this device only, never a script, a temp file, a log, or the network. Every destructive delete here is allowlist-gated first.
Tier 3
Visible hand-off
When you must watch or respond — chiefly the Homebrew installer — the command opens in your visible Terminal. Newlines and control characters are rejected as an injection guard.
Consent, not surprises
One global install mode — and it defaults to safe.
Modern system Pythons mark themselves “externally managed” (PEP 668) and refuse writes without a flag that can overwrite what the OS owns. Rather than scatter that flag around, Catalyst exposes a single, consented setting.
Mode Flag on Python 3.12+ What it means
Protected
— none — The safe default. Respects system integrity; a risky install into system Python is simply refused. Nothing bad happens. User space
--break-system-packages --user Installs into your personal user site instead of the system directory. Safer reach, still your call. System-wide
--break-system-packages Writes directly into the OS-managed Python. Highest reach, highest risk — and always your explicit choice. Turning an override on requires an explicit confirmation that spells out the consequence. Reverting to Protected is safe and takes effect immediately — and while any override is active, a red integrity indicator stays visible in the app. Virtual environments are never externally managed, so they're never flagged and never gated.
The standing guarantees
Nine promises that never bend.
Success is proven, not scraped
Every outcome is decided on the process exit code — never by pattern-matching stdout, which lies.
Deletes go to the Trash
Recoverable removal is preferred over permanent deletion, behind a confirmation dialog showing the count and total size.
Allowlist-gated deletion
Only caches, Cellar, virtualenv, and log directories are ever deletable. System, Library, and your Documents / Desktop / Downloads are blocked outright.
.ssh, .Trash, .git are untouchable
These paths are hard-skipped everywhere, in every scan and every delete.
Marker-guarded scanning
A folder named node_modules or venv is only flagged as cruft when a sibling project marker confirms it — so an app's bundled files are never mistaken for junk.
GhostBuster can't kill anything critical
The port-process finder uses a strict allowlist of dev keywords and a blocklist of critical processes, so it never offers to end something dangerous.
Private keys never leave
SSH tooling shows and copies public keys only. Private keys are never displayed, copied, or exported.
Your password stays yours
The sudo password reaches sudo through memory and stdin only — never a script, a temp file, or a log. So you aren't asked on every action, it rests in the macOS Keychain with a device-only access class: no iCloud sync, no backups, and clearable by you at any time.
Nothing is reported about you
No analytics SDK, no crash reporter, no account, no identifier. Firebase went out at v1.0 and nothing replaced it — the app's four network requests are GETs for static files you can open yourself.